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NAVY OPERATIONS RESEARCH
CAPTAIN WAYNE P. HUGHES JR., USN (RETIRED)
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943, whughes@nps.navy.mil
This paper emphasizes OR’s utility to the U.S. Navy, as seen by its customers. Like many naval officers who subspecialized in operations
research, the author was both producer and consumer of analysis toward improving fleet operations, Pentagon planning, and training
effectiveness. Many of OR’s unnoticed heroes are officers and Navy civilians who, then and now, could put operations analysis to best
practical use. The paper reaches three conclusions, which (briefly) are: (1) The U.S. Navy could shift much analytical talent to improve
fleet readiness and scarcely notice a loss of quality in Washington, (2) the benefit of Navy OR in the Pentagon was not so much in formal
decision making as it was in educating a stream of future leaders about the state of the Navy and cost-constrained possible future states,
and (3) the distinguishing contribution of all OR has been and still is in helping executives make better, timely decisions by applying our
special art of quantitative analysis, and only incidentally in the fidelity or complexity of the models and other tools we employ.
1. TAKING A CUSTOMER’S POINT OF VIEW
Because this is a personal memoir, I speak about naval
operations analysis from the matrix of my own experience,
which includes both production and application of analysis,
both in the fleet and in the Pentagon; both teaching OR and
applying it to improve training.
In many ways, my experience parallels the growth of
OR in the Navy. For about 20 years, the emphasis was
on improving fleet performance and readiness for combat.
Then in the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
introduced systems analysis and planning, programming,
and budgeting in the Pentagon, with a consequent shift of
emphasis to force level and procurement decision making.
By the 1970s, these procedures had been adapted and in
some respects strengthened by the Navy. Meanwhile, the
methods of OR had spread broadly into business, finance,
and transportation. These commercial methods were then
reflected back into Navy logistics, training, and human
resource management. During the 1980s, hand-held and
desktop computers began to have strong effects, largely
but not entirely positive, on Navy analysis. In the 1990s,
computer simulations, computer-assisted war games, and
other forms of computer programming began to domi-
nate the practice of OR. Today, most Navy analysts are
employed in two ways: They participate in the formal and
elaborate process of decision making in Washington, and
they develop and employ an extensive array of powerful
computer programs for resource management and analysis.
I shall make three broad observations but will not attempt
to compare Navy styles with those in the other services
or outside the defense establishment. For a comprehensive
look at sound practice reported by many of the best pro-
fessionals, consult Military Modeling for Decision Making
(Hughes, ed. 1997). The common thread that runs through
most of its chapters is that models are good or bad, depend-
ing on the quality of support to decision makers. With few
exceptions I will take this, the customer’s point of view,
herein.
I was both producer and consumer of operations anal-
ysis. It was and is my belief that uniformed analysts are
particularly valuable as seagoing line officers because, like
me, they have a foot in both camps. OA was only my
Navy subspecialty. The greater rewards for this naval offi-
cer came from command at sea. Early command of a
minesweeper convinced me that nothing else was as satisfy-
ing. A decade later, my destroyer, USS Morton, during the
Vietnam War fired 5,100 shells in naval gunfire support. We
rearmed and refueled 45 times on the deployment. We got
underway or moored 64 times. When not fighting, the Navy
trains. I taught midshipmen for three years and went on
two midshipman cruises. At the Naval Postgraduate School
my subject is military operations research, with emphasis
on past and future naval tactics and the quantitative study
of war.
2. I GET HOOKED ON OA
If the formalization of our profession is dated from either
the first university graduate degrees at NPS or the foun-
dation of ORSA and TIMS, then OR started at the same
time I graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1952.
My future association with operations analysis was deter-
mined in 1953 by the executive officer of my first ship. A
Rhodes scholar who had worked for Admiral Forrest Sher-
man, he told me Sherman was so impressed by the wartime
contribution of operations analysis that he had nurtured
a new OA curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School.
That, said the Exec, was what I must study. It took nine
years before I could enroll, because as my first shore tour
I returned to the Naval Academy to help with the revolu-
tionary changes in curriculum and pedagogy that began in
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1959. I also taught naval history, learning that history books
were oblivious to OA’s influence, even in the Battle of
the Atlantic. However, I stumbled on Antisubmarine War-
fare in World War II (Sternhell and Thorndike 1946) very
early and was fascinated with both its quantitative history
in Part I and its tactical methods and effectiveness evalua-
tion in Part II. By then, I was operations officer in an ASW
hunter killer task group and was intrigued to see how Part
II’s theory of screening had affected fleet tactics in the for-
mations and evolutions we were applying every day at sea.
Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II was one of a
series of post-war reports published by the Navy’s Opera-
tions Evaluation Group. The methods and styles of those
years are well represented in the series, the best known
and still useful of which are Morse and Kimball’s Meth-
ods of Operations Research (Morse and Kimball 1998)
and Koopman’s Search and Screening (Koopman 1946).
The top secret OEG Report 68, Evaluation of the Role of
Decryption Intelligence in the Operational Phase of the
Battle of the Atlantic (OEG 1952), was not declassified
until 1987. It has been drawn on usefully by Brian McCue
(2000) to quantify the value of information in warfare. For
a compilation of Navy OR sources, see the sections entitled
“Other Literature and History” at the end of each chapter
in Wagner et al. (1999). For personal recollections of early
OA, see Blackett (1962) for the British and Morse (1977)
for the American styles. For U.S. Navy precursors to the
OR discipline, and to prove that two American naval offi-
cers preceded both Lanchester and Osipov in formulating
“the Lanchester square law,” see Fiske (1988).
2.1. First Experience: The Cyclops
Study of 1963
When I studied operations analysis at the Naval Postgrad-
uate School from 1962 to 1964 the practice of OR was
20 years old and burgeoning. Midway through our class
work, NPS sent us on a six-week field trip for experience
on the job. I was assigned to the “most important study
in the Navy” (called Cyclops because the study answered
Question 1.i of a tasking memorandum from Secretary
McNamara). The study objective was to apprise the nation’s
leaders of our capacity to keep the Atlantic sea lanes open
to our NATO allies if war broke out in Europe. The Soviet
submarine force was very numerous, and its first nuclear
submarines—the November-class SSNs—were just enter-
ing service. In a basement in Rosslyn, I worked under Joe
Neuendorffer and Jim Larkin and alongside Ken Bohlin,
a young analyst from the Center for Naval Analyses. The
study was to be completed in eight weeks. Within a day or
so of my arrival all hands met to decide whether to program
the mathematical model (a Markov chain of submarine
attacks against convoys) on a computer or do hand calcula-
tions. The wise decision was to go both ways, so Ken and
I, with Frank Houck (who had formulated the equations),
worked late into the night with mechanical desk calculators.
We had long since finished before the programmer had
coded and debugged her program.
Officers who had experienced McNamara’s slant on sys-
tems analysis were invited to guest lecture to the study
team. One was Captain E. P. “Pete” Aurand. He came in
bubbling with pride because he and Pat Parker had done a
study that showed the cost-effectiveness of carrier air rela-
tive to land-based air. A CV and its escorts were expensive.
Naval air power looked more costly than Air Force power
until overseas basing costs were included. Throwing in the
special value of a carrier task force’s mobility convinced
McNamara and Alain Enthoven’s systems analysis staff.
It was the prototype for many carrier studies done over
the years. Russell Murray in the Enthoven’s office became
another convert. Always thorough and objective, many
years later Murray was hired by Dave Kassing, President
of CNA, to review all studies for quality and integrity
before publication. Russ was a precious confidence builder
for CNA’s Navy customers and his “Quest For the Perfect
Study” (Murray 1977) is as pertinent as when he wrote it.
A vexing screen design problem arose soon after I
arrived in Rosslyn. Against conventional submarines, the
standard “bent line screen” tactical formation, developed
in World War II by OEG analysts, packed the escorts in
the front because a conventional sub could not make a
submerged approach from the flanks or rear. But enemy
SSNs could use their high submerged speed to close from
any bearing and, once under the convoy, fire all torpedoes
at close range. When the Cyclops Study was underway it
was evident that a screen optimized against several hundred
diesel subs in the forward 120-degree sector should not
be weakened by spreading the limited number of escorts
through 360 degrees just to guard against a few SSNs. But
as the number of Novembers increased, there would come
a time when they could not be ignored, with the terrible
side effect of allowing the numerous diesel subs to exploit
wide gaps between escorts when the screen in the front was
weakened to protect the rear. What to do then? I had my
thesis topic when I returned to NPS!
2.2. NPS Thesis, 1964: A Tactical Decision Aid
In 1964 Ross Cooper and I worked out the mathematics
of radial and circumferential screen placement as an exten-
sion of the theory in Antisubmarine Warfare in World War
II. We wrote an algorithm that optimized for any number
of screening ships, any size of convoy, against any mix
of nuclear and diesel torpedo-firing submarines. Our the-
ory was durable enough that in 1989 NPS student Keith
Kowalski updated the algorithm in a more powerful form to
account for missile-firing submarines, the employment of
both active and passive ASW search, and the closure speed
of the sub in relative motion for different convoy speeds.
While at NPS, I watched the faculty—including Tom
Oberbeck, Peyton Cunningham, Charles “Doc” Torrance,
and Jack Borsting—scramble to learn the new processes
of systems analysis and PPBS. The objective was to pre-
pare us to fight fire with analytical fire in the Pentagon.
(For a history of OR at NPS that describes the transi-
tion then underway, see Schrady 2001). I graduated with
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two attitudes, neither of which was wholly correct. The
first was that systems analysis was the wave of the future
and would supplant fleet analysis as of greater importance.
Wiser heads knew better. Jay Steinhardt, the director of the
Operations Evaluation Group at the time, said that systems
analysis would destroy operations analysis. He knew that
the Pentagon was too suffused with “unquantifiable fac-
tors” for the ideal of open, explicit, objective analysis to
take hold. In number of man-hours, volume of studies, and
dollars expended on simulation and model building, my
expectation was fulfilled—but as a nightmare instead of a
dream. As for the second attitude, I thought our role would
be to beat the “whiz kids” of OSD at their own game. In
this we in large measure succeeded, although I now think
that Enthoven meant it when he said his intention was to
set an example and foster a capability in the services to
do their own competent analysis. But Enthoven’s vision of
tight, swift, efficient methodologies was soon overtaken by
a cumbersome, bureaucratic system, ripe for distortion and
obfuscation. Initially crisp procedures became formalized
into ever-expanding study specifications in the vain hope
that out of bigger process would grow better product.
3. FLEET OA
Operations analysis assisted the fleet toward better war
plans, operational efficiency, and tactical effectiveness.
Prominent contributors have been the Operations Evalua-
tion Group, a history of which has been written by Tidman
(1984), the Submarine and Destroyer Development Groups,
and the VX air squadrons for tactical experimentation and
technology development. In the 1950s through the early
1970s, COMASWFORLANT and COMASWFORPAC
vied with each other as the best centers of integrated
fleet readiness, experimentation, and analysis. VADMs Pete
Aurand and Fred Bennett stand out as two archetypal fleet
leaders who knew how to apply OA. I do not think the num-
bered fleets’ exploitation of OA in strike and air defense
tactics could match the two ASW commands in their exer-
cise planning, reconstruction, and day-to-day activities, but
I know good work was done in them, too. At the 69th Mil-
itary Operations Research Symposium in June 2001, Ralph
Beatty described air defense analysis of the 1950s, includ-
ing his work with John Coyle on a “haystack formation”
for safeguarding carriers against nuclear attack long enough
to get off their first and only strike. He said the personal
receptivity of Sixth Fleet commanders Harry Felt and “Cat”
Brown was critical. The high skill and influence of OA
for fleet air operations over many years may be inferred
by reading a delightful, insightful CNA report, “JADO/JEZ
Analysis: Lessons Learned for Joint Test and Evaluation”
(Carroll et al. 1995). The four participants are old pros from
OEG who describe what had initially been an overly struc-
tured attempt to test new joint air warfare procedures. Their
modifications to the test plan blended rigor with practical-
ity, based on their years of experience in fleet OA and the
knowledge that tactical development has its own attributes.
The Office of Naval Research provided continuity and
resources, especially when Bob Miller sponsored both fleet
tactical development and the Military Operations Research
Society through much of the 1960s and 1970s. Among the
best of the contractors, prominent are the late Dan Wagner
and the many analysts in whom he instilled analytical rigor
and a devotion to navy readiness. Another is Ervin Kapos:
He was a director of OEG, a founding board member and
longstanding supporter of MORS, CEO of two companies
involved in fleet analysis, a personal mentor to me over
many years, and a trusted adviser to Admiral Isaac C. Kidd.
When Kidd was CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT, Kapos col-
laborated in a tactical training program for flag officers.
It took Kidd’s forceful leadership and Kapos’ skillful Tac-
tical Command Readiness Program of study guides and
war games to pull off what has never again been matched:
advanced tactical training for admirals in command at sea.
3.1. Atlantic Escort Exercise,
LANTCORTEX 1–73
A personal example of fleet analysis occurred when I was
Assistant Chief of Staff for Analysis under Admiral Bennett
in late 1972. He was charged with testing the Sea Con-
trol Ship (SCS), one of the low-mix concepts of Admiral
Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations. USS Guam, a flat-
topped amphibious ship, served as surrogate “SCS.” In the
test, it carried a squadron of ASW helicopters for convoy
screening against “Soviet” submarines and three AV-8A
Harrier jet fighters for limited air defense. As a complica-
tion, the submarine community argued successfully to add
two U.S. nuclear submarines as part of the screen to test
their SSN escort concept. Next, USS Patterson, a frigate
towing a prototype sonar array, was added to the exer-
cise. It was my task to design an experiment from which
as much information as possible could be gleaned during
ten days of intensive interactions between submarines, their
target (played by the Guam), and the assorted screening
units. One could not say the exercise in the LANTCORTEX
series was typical, but it illustrates a focus on careful plan-
ning and exercise reconstruction at the time.
As was usual, we placed the “enemy” submarines so
that the task group would pass back and forth across their
assigned boxes to force a large number of tactical interac-
tions. We worked on the antisubmarine screen formation
with exquisite care. The Patterson was stationed dead ahead
of the Guam, and one SSN escort was put on either side
of her. The ASW helicopters from the “Sea Control Ship”
monitored lines of sonobuoys on each flank and served
as pouncers to prosecute subs once detected. The exact
spacing depended on detection ranges, which were partly
based on theory, partly on extrapolations of at-sea tests, and
always on measured local sonar conditions.
I say extrapolation because there was almost no experi-
ence with the prototype tactical array streamed astern by
the Patterson. During the exercise, her detection perfor-
mance was so extraordinary and unlike anything the surface
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navy had ever experienced that I heloed over to watch.
The system was a hodgepodge. The sensor array cable was
streamed from a reel welded temporarily on the fantail.
Wires ran from the cable to the helicopter hangar, where
sonarmen and civilian technicians scanned oscillographs
that detected and tracked submarine after submarine. Vener-
able sound-powered telephones passed bearings and ranges
to the Patterson’s Combat Information Center (CIC). With
the CIC evaluator’s concurrence, submarine locations were
sent by radiotelephone to the tactical commander in the
Guam. Patterson’s captain sat in his chair on the bridge
because that’s where tradition-conscious captains lived at
sea, but to his credit, he knew the surface navy had a win-
ner in the tactical array. A technology breakthrough will
overcome all sorts of awkward growing pains like those in
the Patterson. The exercise was proof enough of a system
that was going to revolutionize surface ship ASW.
The SSN escort experiment was productive in a differ-
ent way and led to a search for another tactical employ-
ment. From the submariner’s point of view, expensive SSNs
should support valuable carrier task forces, not mundane
convoys. From our point of view, we wanted the certainty
that any submarine we found near the convoy was an
enemy. In addition, surface ships with towed arrays could
more easily pass tracking information to aircraft for prose-
cuting an attack.
The outcome of the SCS experiment was more com-
plicated. SCS success depended on new tactics, which
we didn’t have, and the tactical commander’s staff lacked
enthusiasm to develop. I had frustrating conversations with
the admiral, who thought his responsibility began and
ended by rigidly following the test plan. He was so unyield-
ing that when a “red” submarine was detected and tracked
coming at the Guam, he refused to take an evasive course
and—you guessed it—we were “torpedoed.” The next sum-
mer Staser Holcomb, a brilliant analyst and dynamic leader,
was given command of the Guam for another test called
SEACONEX. His crew passed the test with room to spare.
But Congress scratched the SCS, the rumor having been
circulated that only an officer of Holcomb’s talent could
fight the SCS successfully.
The exercise was typical as a mixture of hardware testing
and tactical development. We had not proved the conclu-
sions about the tactical array, the SSN escort, and the SCS,
but the general outcome was clear to Bennett and his staff.
An exercise at sea is as much for tactical development and
training as it is for statistical testing. Most new weapons,
sensors, and command-and-control systems entail new tac-
tics to reach their full potential.
At ASWFORLANT, we reconstructed exercises metic-
ulously. Manual data collection was a burden on ship’s
company and too extensive for analysts to gather by them-
selves, so in the 1970s automated data gathering and
reconstruction were becoming a cottage industry. Before
the global positioning system (GPS), no ship or aircraft
knew precisely where it was. There was a lot of judg-
ment involved in the difficult art of exercise reconstruc-
tion and heated dispute over the number of detections and
kills. An error of a half-mile spelled the difference between
a submarine’s “missiles” being well aimed or a bust, or
a sonar “detection” being an enemy submarine or just a
whale. Submariners had to run a gauntlet to get in position
to fire a torpedo (a green flare) and they were congeni-
tally optimistic about their success in evading ASW forces.
Only an exercise reconstruction could determine if they had
reached attack position without being detected and “killed.”
4. FORCE LEVEL AND SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
In contrast to fleet OA, it is beyond my capacity to
list the plethora of organizations that contributed to
Navy force level and procurement decision making in
Washington. A comprehensive list would fill a book. Sec-
retary McNamara’s introduction of systems analysis was
intended to be a more efficient way to make decisions, but
the result was a growing analytical bureaucracy in which
procedure dominated substance.
My first broad observation is this: If we analysts applied
our own methods to the deployment of the Navy’s analytical
resources, surely we would have shifted a greater portion of
our analytical effort to the fleet. We could have tripled the
effort at sea, where the benefit is immediate, without any
reduction whatsoever in military OR’s utility in Washington
decision making.
Because I have nothing good to say about DoD’s for-
malisms and pretenses at objectivity, I will develop next
what I believe was the real benefit of Navy systems analy-
sis, as I observed it in three tours in the Pentagon.
The Navy responded vigorously to the introduction
of PPBS by Charles Hitch and the influence of Alain
Enthoven’s systems analysis. The Secretary of the Navy
was Paul Nitze. He thought analytically, in the broadest and
best sense of the word, and created the Office of Program
Appraisal as his personal staff of analysts. At the invitation
of Nitze and Enthoven, we sent some of our best young
officers to their staffs, to include many future military and
civilian leaders such as Staser Holcomb, Stansfield Turner,
Robin Pirie, Charles DiBona, John Poindexter, Jerry Miller,
Mark Hill, and Bob Monroe. In 1966, I was ordered to
OP-96, the newly created Systems Analysis division under
Rear Admiral Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt. Those were heady
times for a young commander. We were on center stage
because decisions were going to be made “by analysis.”
4.1. The Major Fleet Escort Study, 1967
The next year I was assigned to the Major Fleet Escort
Study. Its influence endured for at least 20 years, long after
its object—ultimately the Spruance-class destroyer—was
built and operating. The MFE Study abided because it
pegged the number of escorts to the numbers and types of
forces they protected and in this way determined surface
combatant force levels. Although several attempts were
made to update it, none were compelling or had any effect
on warship characteristics or numbers. I think the reasons
it was a landmark study were three.
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First, everyone in the Pentagon knew that the Navy was
going to have to replace a large number of destroyers built
in World War II and wanted a successful study, though with
diverging objectives. The staff of OSD (Systems Analysis)
conceded that the Navy should define the ship characteris-
tics but wanted the power to build fewer of them if they
were expensive. The surface navy wanted both quality and
numbers. The rest of the Navy wanted safely escorted car-
riers, amphibious ships, and convoys, but not at the expense
of their own programs. The ASW czar wanted to dictate
the new escort’s ASW equipment.
The second reason for success was a continuous stream
of briefings to the many interested players. As leader of the
ASW analysis, I had to fight for time to do our work, but
the payoff of those briefings was decisive. When we were
done there were no surprises. All interested offices were
now parties to the assumptions that drove the results. Nei-
ther they nor we could know how the study would come out
but when the results were tolerable, there was a great col-
lective acceptance along the lines that “I know what drives
these results. What would have surprised and offended me
at the outset I now see to be reasonable.” Thus, the study
became a great unifying force.
The third reason MFE succeeded, though at the price
of much additional analytical labor, was the decision cri-
terion. The inspiration came from LCDR Charlie DiBona,
who worked for Nitze in OPA. It was an adaptation of the
already well-known “Mathematics of Maximization,” writ-
ten by Enthoven as an appendix to Hitch and McKean’s
(1960) classic. DiBona postulated an “efficient” number of
escorts to assign any escorted force, determined by adding
more of them until the cost of the next escort was more on
the margin than buying another ship that it was protecting.
The criterion has some technical and practical limitations,
and it involved an enormous amount of data and analysis.
But it was objective and fair and had a well-defined stan-
dard by which to decide “how much is enough.”
There is a contemporaneous offspring of the MFE Study.
By 1993, the surface navy did a lot more than escort other
ships. Many surface ships now performed self-contained
tasks, and new missions were impending, such as theater
ballistic missile defense. Yet there was no new rationale
to replace “escorting,” and the surface warship force was
under pressure to reduce its numbers even while its respon-
sibilities were growing. In an atmosphere of crisis, the
CNO’s Surface Warfare Division asked the Applied Physics
Laboratory of The Johns Hopkins University for help. It
happened that I was lecturing there on campaign analysis
for Leigh Ebbert and Dick Hunt. Much of the tactical anal-
ysis and other groundwork in deployment cycles and man-
ning had been done, but there was no unifying methodol-
ogy. Overnight, we decided that the MFE Study’s decision
criterion could be adapted, after adding some new twists of
our own. We corrected weaknesses in the efficiency crite-
rion, included the new, independent tasks done by surface
combatants, and we used two contemporary scenarios. We
specified a criterion of “sufficiency” that was easy to grasp
by the decision makers. In very short order, the Surface
Combatant Force Level Study was done. It was received
with initial skepticism in OSD and probably elsewhere, but
it was solid, objective work and in time gained acceptance
and influence. Like MFE, SCFLS gives a unifying under-
standing of surface combatant roles, missions, and value.
4.2. The 1970s CPAM Process
In 1973, I came to the Pentagon for the second time to be
Deputy in OP-96. The post-Vietnam budget was under pres-
sure, and CNOs Zumwalt and Holloway turned to OP-96
for a trustworthy appraisal when what to cut, rather than
what to buy, was the issue. The Directors of OP-96 were
successively Harry Train and Staser Holcomb. Train was
a pol-mil guy with near-perfect instincts, among which
were whose analyses to trust. I was in effect a techni-
cal adviser on short-fuse analyses, and Art Pennington, the
Chief Scientist, played the same role for big studies. Train
also had a sense of priorities that left me to deal with a
wide array of small stuff. He created a long-range planning
branch of five brilliant young officers to give the CNO cost-
constrained advice about an affordable future Navy, with
which both Zumwalt and Holloway were much pleased.
By contrast, Holcomb was as analytically experienced as
I was, so we split the work. He took air and submarine
programs because they were hardest; for example he had to
deal with Admiral Rickover’s naval nuclear reactors staff.
I took surface and logistics programs.
Under us were an array of young officers who made
life a joy, such as Vern Clark, Dennis Blair, Bill Hancock,
Guy Zeller, Grant Sharp, Jack Baldwin, Jim Busey, Paul
McCarthy, Art Cebrowski, Steve Clarey, Jim Stark, Jim
Patton, and Ted Baker. For continuity, we had reliable civil-
ians like Pennington, George Haering (he gave briefings
that were the epitome of analytical clarity), Bob Hallex (he
wrote the chapter on Navy analysis in Military Modeling
1984), and Joe Kammerer (he went on to lead the Chief of
Naval Material’s cost analysis).
Surrounding us were officers who spoke our language:
OP-90 (Programming) was either Al Whittle or Ron Hays
and OP-901 was my NPS study buddy, Joe Metcalf.
OP-902 was a favorite classmate Bill Zobel, uniquely a
CEC officer. I was in OP-90 spaces about as often as my
own.
For a while, Tom Hayward was OP-96’s boss as OP-090
(Program Planning). Then and later as CNO, Hayward
railed against the follies of systems analysis, but he was
one of its most astute customers and knew how to ask for
and use spare, streamlined products.
In OP-60 (Strategic Plans), a junior admiral who, like
Harry Train, understood what analysis could and could not
do, was Bill Crowe. For a while, Train required me to
call on Crowe every week to “smooth over strained rela-
tions.” Crowe and I in short order decided the relations had
become unstrained, but as long as they lasted my trips to
his office were a personal treat.
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There is purpose behind the name-dropping. The officers
above me who led the Navy were by then exploiting our
own Navy PPBS format, the “CPAM Process” (CNO Pro-
gram Analysis Memoranda. Under various titles the CPAM
process is still carried out annually as a structured attempt
to give the CNO objective programmatic advice). The
young officers in and around OP-96 would in due course
lead the future Navy, because OP-96 was seen not only
as a source of analytical advice but as a training ground
for future Pentagon leaders. We blended officers holding
OR degrees and other officers with promise as future lead-
ers who could learn on the job. Parenthetically I must
add that OP-96 had no corner on the talent market, even
among OR degree holders. Dick Macke, Dave Emerson,
Tom Hughes, Scott Redd, and my friend and neighbor, Dick
Miller, exemplify future leaders whose influence was felt
elsewhere. Outside the Navy, NPS graduates Jim Roche and
Tom White were recently appointed the Secretaries of the
Air Force and Army.
This brings me to the second of my three broad observa-
tions. The biggest benefit of Navy analysis in Washington
was not in justifying a new system or rationalizing a force
level. The 1967 MFE Study was a rare success in deci-
sion making by systems analysis and only possible because
there was already a consensus that it must succeed. The
enduring benefit of OR in the Pentagon was in educating a
stream of our best officers about the state of the Navy and
the cost-constrained possible states of a future Navy.
The compulsory analyses—often resented, always
debated, keenly felt in every corner of the Navy’s psyche—
created a unifying experience. There came to pass a col-
lective understanding of how well we were prepared for
any conflict, from yet another crisis in Lebanon to general
nuclear war. I do not mean leadership learned these things
from analysis; I mean that already well-informed and astute
leaders had their images refined when OR quantified things
for them. For example, in those days, a series of campaign
analyses, done about once a year with a variety of objec-
tives, became a great force in creating a commonly shared
picture. Bob Hallex (1984) has listed, and Bruce Powers
(1997) has repeated, the most prominent ones, from the
aforementioned Cyclops Study of 1963 through Sea Plan
2000 done in 1979.
Then, after John Lehman became Secretary of the Navy
in 1980, there followed a decade of no such campaign stud-
ies. On the good side, in the 1990s the Navy got back into
campaign analyses to educate a new generation of lead-
ers. Some of the best work is being done in the opera-
tional commands, where tactics and technology go hand
in hand. In the Pacific theater (the only region where I
have recent personal experience), the analysis staffs are
small, highly focused, and free of bureaucratic impedi-
ments. Joint emphasis is growing, too. Admiral Blair, now
USCINCPAC, says, “We can increase joint capability best
by adaptation and experimentation in the fleet and in the
field” (Remarks, Navy League, Washington DC on 11 April
2001). On the bad side, much strategic analysis is being
done today with elaborate simulations and war games,
which often cloud linkages between cause and effect and
lack the clarity afforded by campaign analyses as I remem-
ber them.
To sum up, our leaders are better served by analysis
as a way to draw together diverse points of view than
in the formal decision-making process. It does not mat-
ter whether decisions in Washington are mostly politics or
mostly statesmanship. Force levels and individual system
choices cannot be determined by ever more complicated
processes, models, studies, and results.
4.3. The Sea Based Air Platform Study of 1978
An illustration of a unifying analysis in an environment
governed by politics and statesmanship occurred in my
third tour in the Pentagon. I was Executive Assistant to
Under Secretary of Navy Jim Woolsey. In 1978, the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees were at logger-
heads over whether the next carrier would have a nuclear
or a conventional power plant. They decided to temporize
by asking for a six-month study to determine which candi-
date was better. The study was assigned to OP-96, then led
by another officer with a bright future, Carlisle Trost, who
passed it to CNA. Six months seems a long time, but for
practical purposes that allows about two months of analy-
sis. When the Sea Based Air Platform Study was complete,
Woolsey was charged by Secretary Claytor to review it, so
I was among the first to appreciate its genius.
There were actually three candidates reported on: a large
CVN, a conventional CV of the same size, and a mid-
sized carrier for STOVL aircraft, called a CVV. The study
examined each candidate in seven plausible scenarios. Each
of the three was shown to be the cost-effective choice in at
least two of the scenarios! Thus, the study showed that the
preferred carrier depended on one’s image of the war to be
fought. If there had been a dominant solution, the choice
would have long before been clear.
The study also contributed to the education of all par-
ties by emphasizing lifetime systems costs. The debate in
Congress had centered on construction costs, and the CVN
was substantially the most expensive ship to build. The
study compared the system costs of the carriers, and so
included two generations of aircraft flying off them. Based
on procuring both carrier and aircraft and operating them
for 30 years or more, a CVN’s total ownership cost was
only slightly more expensive than a CV’s. Either CVN or
CV had a big advantage over the little CVV in number of
aircraft carried for the same system cost. With total own-
ership costs so close, it was reasonable to let the Navy’s
preference be decisive. The next year Congress authorized
a CVN!
5. EDUCATION AND TRAINING: ILLUSTRATING
THE EXPANSION OF OR
Almost from the beginning, the methods of post-war
operations research insinuated themselves into the fabric of
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business and commerce. Many essays in this special edition
show how OR diffused into many fields. My introduction
to the phenomenon occurred when I was Chief of Naval
Education and Training Support in Pensacola from 1975 to
1977. By then, Navy education specialists were using OR
tools big time.
The lesser example of OR applications was in Instruc-
tional Systems Development, the goal of which was to
train enlisted personnel to measurable standards more cost-
effectively. I have no space to describe how the “EdSpecs”
were using OR, but suffice it to say I felt right at home.
The Chief of Naval Education and Training, VADM Jim
Wilson, was a believer in incisive analysis and empow-
ered us at CNET Support to apply ISD analysis vigorously
throughout his entire command.
5.1. Analysis of Aircraft Simulators, Circa 1975
The greater example concerns evaluating models for train-
ing. Aircraft simulator construction and support came under
me. Some simulators cost more than the parent aircraft
being emulated, and they were fast becoming central in
teaching flight proficiency. Before I took over as CNET
Support, George Haering arranged for me to “fly” in three
simulators so that I would understand the basis of two
great controversies under investigation by EdSpecs. The
first debate was over the attributes of realistic flight train-
ing. Early simulators for practice landings had a realistic
model board with little buildings and trees. By 1975, vir-
tual simulation technology could emulate terrain in blocky
surfaces. The advocates of virtual representations said that
aviators used only simple cues to orient themselves in near-
land flying, hence high-fidelity images like individual trees
were a waste. It was a problem made for human factors
analysis, an EdSpec skill. The analysis demonstrated that,
at a saving of large amounts of money, relatively simple vir-
tual terrain gave enough visual cues for effective learning.
The second debate was over the extent to which flying a
simulator could substitute for flying an airplane. Leaders in
the air training command had embraced simulators as sup-
plements to cockpit time. Systems analysts embraced sim-
ulators as substitutes to reduce much more expensive time
in the air. (High-fidelity simulators were costly to build,
but a fledgling pilot could hop in the simulator cockpit
and a few seconds later be “flying” in a virtual air com-
bat maneuvering range against a human or simulated foe.)
The decision as to a cost-effective mix of aircraft and sim-
ulator flight time was to some extent judgmental, but there
was general agreement on two fundamental results of anal-
ysis. First, the simulator had to respond to controls like the
real aircraft aerodynamically with little room for compro-
mise. Second, aircraft response was best cued by an accu-
rate instrument panel for IFR (poor-visibility flying), or
coarse-grained visual images for air-to-air combat and VFR
(good-visibility flying). Motion in bank was usually worth-
while, but expensive six-degrees-of-motion simulators were
unjustifiable. A third factor, self-evident without analysis,
was the sheer physical stress—pulling “g’s”—of flight that
no simulator could duplicate.
5.2. The Growth of Model Building
After the tour in the training command, I was acutely aware
of how fast “our” simulations and methods were spread-
ing throughout society. Ten years before the deluge, I knew
parents were foredoomed to see computer games revolu-
tionize juvenile entertainment. Already in 1975, I saw the
Navy as stodgy and inept in developing tactical trainers and
inefficient to the point of embarrassment in exploiting the
state of the art of war-gaming technology. The commercial
world had adapted our tools and was racing ahead of us in
efficiency and “playability.”
Computer technology offered new potential for realis-
tic modeling, so much so that it became hard to know
which modeling was in our domain. In the 1990s, pro-
fessional model building threatened to alter the culture of
all operations research. Model construction is a big busi-
ness, at which 1970s Navy training simulators had only
hinted. Now not only training but science, engineering,
finance, entertainment, transportation, advertising—the list
seems endless—employ visual images, often dynamic, to
augment traditional stylized simulations and artfully sim-
plified mathematical representations.
To coin a phrase, today’s modelers create “plausi-
ble realities.” Ship construction is enhanced not only by
CAD/CAM, borderline “modeling,” but also by virtual
images of compartments that one can “walk through” and
inspect. These are computer technology’s equivalent of air-
craft cockpit and ship control station mock-ups. Virtual
compartments for damage control training are an alterna-
tive to the old-fashioned USS Buttercup, a damage con-
trol trainer of steel compartments, employing real water,
smoke, and fire. Children play computerized Dungeons
and Dragons. Children and adults play the popular naval
game “Harpoon” with plausibly real or ridiculously unreal
scenarios—it’s their choice. At the Naval Postgraduate
School, we teach naval history, tactics, and the character-
istics of simulations using a computer war game of the
Battle of Midway. Among us analysts, model fidelity is a
crucial issue. Fidelity is big with commercial game design-
ers, too, but their fidelity means it “looks real” and plays
fast. Modern modeling methods make plausibility a many-
faceted issue in the model building community.
In science, the double helix genetic code is a static
model, but it is intricate and manipulatable. In economics,
the Club of Rome’s dynamical representations predicted
astonishing things about growth, some of which came to
pass. In finance, every broker has a market-predicting tool.
These models are all supposed to create not plausible but
probable realities. For dramatic visual representations the
entertainment industry shows the way. The new movie of
the attack on Pearl Harbor is full of fast-paced, highly
detailed virtual imagery that plausibly recreates the real
attack. Stephen Spielberg’s Star Wars was the prototype of
futuristic combat simulation, which was plausible enough
to enchant children and not a few adults. Who is to say and
by what standard that a Navy game with a scenario set in
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2020 (and we play them on a regular basis) is more plausi-
ble than a child’s game? Aye, there’s the rub. We operations
analysts say that we decide. In the future, we are going to
be less and less in the business of building intricate simula-
tions and more and more in the business of helping others
design them to task and test their efficacy.
This is a contentious issue, first because models that sup-
port analysis have been our lifeblood; and second, because
careers can be made in model building. But I can see only
one outcome: Operations analysts are experiencing a return
to our roots. My third and final observation is that naval
operations analysts needs always to keep in mind the source
of our uniqueness. The property that has always distin-
guished our profession is our ability to help combat leaders
and Navy executives make better decisions with our special
art of quantitative analysis.
6. INSPIRATION, COLLABORATION, AND TRUST
Fleet OA is productive when there is a bond of trust
between a commander and his analyst. An inspired leader
operates from insights gained by operational experience.
The analyst enriches his commander’s instincts with a
deeper understanding in quantitative detail. Either of the
two may challenge the status quo. OEG analysts said they
were extra motivated at sea because they knew in wartime
they could go down with the ship like everyone else. But
in a formal sense, it is the responsibility of the commander
and staff to envision a new piece of equipment, or a tactic,
or a combination of both. The analyst then treats the vision
as a hypothesis for testing. Fleet analysis leads to produc-
tive collaboration because actual achievement is measured.
When collaboration and trust guide, OA testing need not
be a rigid, formal, statistical process; in fact, it is more
effective when it is free flowing and every exercise gives
immediate insights that are incorporated in the next one.
We conducted LANTCORTEX, and Neider and Chambers
modified the JADO/JEZ tests, in ways that went beyond
the current model-test-model approach, which is useful as
far as it goes. Our productive fleet analysis was more
like conceive-test-modify-test. This was the way Morse
and Kimball (1998) thought performance measurement and
improvement must be done under the urgency of war. In the
fleet, the giants I served were Ike Kidd as COMFIRSTFLT
and Fred Bennett as COMASWFORLANT. A tactical com-
mander with the same knack was “Bing” Gillette. Captain
Charlie Woods, one of the early NPS OA grads and my
mentor in OP-96, was the archetype commander at sea and
analyst ashore, who thought both operationally and analyti-
cally everywhere. Each knew how to supplement his inspi-
ration with our perspiration, and we perspired a lot.
All operations analysis adds structure and discipline
to the decision process. McNamara’s systems analysis
instilled structure and discipline, too, but in the Pentagon, it
was applied in an atmosphere of competition and distrust.
He introduced systems analysis explicitly to obtain control
over service programs. The mutual trust and reward in the
fleet were impossible in Washington. Decision making by
analysis took on a hostile, jaded, and onerous cast. Because
analysis of “paper airplanes” and imagined weapon system
designs could be, and sometimes was, biased, the disci-
plining procedures and processes became more and more
elaborate; a fool’s attempt at a foolproof structure of ever-
expanding reviews and hurdles.
The inevitable tension between competing staffs was not
so bad when analysis reports were slender and transpar-
ent. I thought that OP-96 communicated more easily with
SecNav’s OPA and SecDef’s Systems Analysis than within
our Navy staff. We analysts spoke the same language,
and most of us protected our reputations for integrity;
whereas some (not all) contract analysts helping to promote
a new Navy widget would unblushingly produce fat sales
brochures with numbers.
Inspired leaders in OPNAV could and did use their
trusted analysts collaboratively. Zumwalt and Holloway
drew on OP-96 effectively when I was there. Tom Hayward
as OP-090 and as CNO was even more astute at letting
analysis serve him while resisting the ever more demand-
ing formalities of the procurement process. In my memory,
Paul Nitze as Secretary of the Navy was the most skill-
ful of all in demanding and employing practical analytical
work in Washington.
While I was in the training command, Jim Wilson, Tyler
Dedman, and Joe Ekelund were masterful at instilling ana-
lytical collaboration and trust.
There were, as you might suppose, many otherwise good
Navy leaders afloat and ashore who were frightened of
analysis and saw it as a threat instead of as a supplement
to their insights. But I name no names.
To come full circle back to the Naval Postgraduate
School’s curriculum in military operations research, the
reason I believe that our graduates should be line officers
aspiring to command is because then they will wear two
hats. Wearing a hat as analyst, they are producers who
know how a Navy customer thinks and what he needs.
Wearing their other hat in command, they know the advan-
tages and pitfalls of operations analysis in the fleet and
systems analysis in Washington.
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